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PUTNAM'S COMPLAINT 
Jack K. Horner 
One of the most acrimoniously disputed issues in 
contemporary philosophy of language is whether or not, 
or in what sense, humans may be said to possess an 
innate language-specific mobilization and acquisition 
capacity. At the heart of this dispute lies a slogan 
proponents of linguistic innatism have proclaimed as 
their credo of war, the so-called "innatist hypothesis" 
(I.H. , for short): the human brain is "programmed" at 
birth with some quite specific and structured aspects 
of human natural language; in particular, every 
linguistically competent human innately possesses a 
class S of transformational grammars Gi, G 2 , . . . , and 
a function f which assigns weights to elements of this 
class in a manner modulated by experience. All members 
of S are held to share certain very general features 
known as "linguistic universals" such as an active-
passive distinction, a transformational component, 
linguistic categories such as concrete noun, verb 
taking an abstract subject, and so on. This hypothesis, 
the proponents oflinguistic innatism claim, is 
virtually unavoidable on any account of linguistic 
behavior which adequately accounts for both the 
existence of linguistic universals and the empirical 
facts of language acquisition. 
Several philosophers have balked at accepting the 
I.H.; indeed, some have found the proposal strong 
evidence of its proponents' senility.1 Prominent among 
the movements of this antagonistic requiem is the 
ubiquitous recitative of Professor Hilary Putnam.2 Yet 
Putnam's lamentation is, if I am not mistaken, a 
prelude to a premature burial. For if I understand him 
correctly, Professor Putnam's arguments do not, for a 
variety of reasons, succeed in impugning the innatist 
view. To elaborate this criticism, I will first 
briefly review several linguistic phenomena which I 
hold an adequate theory of linguistic behavior must 
explain; Putnam's remarks will then be assessed 
against these data. 
The first datum which an adequate theory of 
language must be able to explain is what I will call 
the "creative" aspect of language. Much of what we 
say or recognize as well-formed parts of language is 
new to us, in the sense that it is not merely a 
repetition of anything we have heard before, nor is it, 
in any important sense, a repetition of patterns we 
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have experienced before. 
Secondly, it can be shown that the number of 
sentences which a normal adult user of language can 
potentially recognize as grammatical is infinite; 
certain subclasses of English, for example, have been 
shown to have infinite cardinality. Accordingly, an 
adequate linguistic theory must account for such a 
capacity, given the temporally limited resources of 
the organism. There is only one way that such a 
capacity could exist, namely, if the structure of 
language acquisition or recognition could in effect 
be characterized by a set of recursive rules capable 
of generating the set of well-formed expressions of 
the natural language. 3 
Thirdly, it is a reasonably well-accepted observa-
tion that children acquire a grammar based on very 
degenerate evidence or reinforcement. For example, 
many of the expressions they encounter during the 
language acquisition period are not well-formed: adult 
speech often contains slurs, false stops, spurious 
phonemes, and so on. Yet these errors are rejected 
as such very early in the child's linguistic develop-
ment. More generally, the linguistic "input" which 
children receive by the time they may be said to 
possess linguistic competence does not determine the 
grammar they actually acquire. This fact can be 
shown without appealing to elaborate evidence, in the 
following way. At any given time t Q in a child's life, 
he will have experienced a finite set K„ of distinct 
well-formed expressions E, ,...,E of his language. 
Consider, then, the following very crude grammars: 
(Rl) Only elements of K_ are well-formed 
expressions. 
(R2) Let K be the class consisting of the 
following 
<i) E,,... , E «K; 
(ii) any conjunction of members of K is a 
member of K 
Any member of K is we 11-formed. 
Note first of all that any expression satisfying Rl 
satisfies R2, but not conversely. This implies that 
the elements of K_ satisfy both Rl and R2. Hence K Q 
is not sufficient to determine uniquely a grammar; 
moreover, the list of rules above can be extended in-
definitely.Accordingly, any given finite set of 
expressions satisfies an infinite number of grammatical 
rules, and thus Kg is not sufficient to determine even 
a finite class of grammars. Hence an adequate theory 
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of linguistic behavior must posit that the determina-
tion of grammar in language acquisition involves some 
feature not implied by the data which the language 
learner meets. 
Fourthly, all children in a given language 
community develop the same grammar, often enough in 
spite of radically different "inputs." It is quite 
likely, in fact, that in a given language community, 
there are children whose "inputs" are disjoint; 
accordingly, an adequate linguistic theory would have 
to show how the same grammars can be developed from 
disjoint data sets. Now any such theory will have to 
attribute to the language acquisition capacity some 
feature which is not implied by the elements of the 
data sets. 
Finally, all human languages possess the same 
general form of grammar; in particular all known 
languages have a transformational rather than a 
phrase-structure grammar, all have the subject-verb 
relation, all have quantifiers, and all have proper 
nouns. 
I now wish to evaluate Putnam's arguments against 
the I.H. in light of these data, showing that (1) 
several of his arguments simply are not cogent; and 
(2) even if all Putnam's attacks on the I.H. were 
cogent, they are not all parts of a unified theory 
of linguistic behavior, and hence, at the very least, 
constitute a view less coherent than the I.H. 
According to Putnam, many innatists cite the 
existence of linguistic universals as evidence in 
support of the I.H. But surely, he insists, there 
are accounts explaining the existence of linguistic 
universals which do not appeal to the existence of 
some language-specific acquisition capacity. In 
particular, we might imagine a community of Martians 
whose innate intellectual equipment is as different 
from ours as is compatible with their being able to 
have a language at all. Suppose further that Martian 
brains are not vastly richer than ours. Accordingly, 
they will find it possible to employ an infinite set 
of expressions only if these expressions possess a 
grammar consisting of a finite set of recursive rules. 
If the I.H. amounts to nothing more than the assertion 
Martians must employ a grammar, Putnam argues, then 
the I.H. could not possibly be false; but of course 
if that were so, it would not be interesting either. 
But in any case, we would not have to invoke the 
existence of a specific set of grammars, S, built 
in the brain of both Martian and humans to account for 
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the existence of linguistic universals.5 
Putnam's objection, then argues that we do not 
have to invoke the I.H. to show that Martian and 
natural human languages all have some grammar or other; 
indeed, the existence of a grammar can be explained 
strictly by appealing to the need of both kinds of 
languages to embody a finite set of recursive rules. 
It must surely be conceded, whatever faults the argument 
may possess, that the mere existence of grammars for 
a set of languages does not constitute sufficient 
grounds for invoking the I.H. But beyond this the 
claim that the explanation of the existence of some 
grammar for each language community does not require 
the I.H. fails to address an important datum. In 
particular, an adequate theory of linguistic behavior 
must explain why all human languages possess the same 
kind of grammar. It is just this very peculiar property 
of all human grammars that strongly suggests the 
existence of a universal human grammar, deriving from 
a source independent of variation in human experience, 
namely the innate linguistic capacities of men. Hence, 
that Martian has some grammar and that all human 
languages have some grammar, and that these two grammars 
differ, does not in the least impugn the claim advanced 
by the linguistic innatists. 
Putnam offers yet another explanation for the 
existence of linguistic universals. Let us suppose, 
he says, that language-using human beings evolved 
independently in two or more places. Then according 
to the innatist hypothesis, there should be two or 
more types of human being descended from the two or 
more original populations, such that normal children 
of each type would fail to learn the language of the 
other. Since we do not ever observe such failures, 
and since there is only one class S built into all 
human brains, we have to conclude, if the I.H. is true, 
that language-using involves a sort of evolutionary 
discontinuity that occurred only once. In that case, 
however, it is overwhelmingly likely that all human 
languages are descended from a single original language. 
But indeed, Putnam counters, the latter is likely 
even if the I.H. is false, since the human race is 
generally held to have resulted from a single evolu-
tionary development and since then the human population, 
initially quite small, spread but slowly. Thus, even 
if language use were completely learned or invented 
rather than built in, it is likely that some group of 
humans first developed language as we know it, and then 
this language spread to the rest of the world. If all 
human languages are descended thus from a common 
parent, then just such highly useful features of the 
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common parent such as quantifiers, proper nouns, and 
in general, the linguistic universals we in fact observe 
would be expected to survive. Thus one can explain the 
existence of linguistic universals merely by appealing 
to the "common origin" hypothesis, and hence the 
invocation of the I.H. is merely gratuitous.6 
Whatever else may be said about this objection in 
particular, one must surely agree that the existence 
of linguistic universals does not constitute conclusive 
evidence for the I.H. Nevertheless, the objection 
overlooks a very important feature of linguistic 
behavior, namely, the transmission of language to 
children. Since children master the grammar of their 
language on evidence which fails to determine even 
a finite class of grammars, it is clear that they must 
supply, independently of the data, the appropriate 
grammar or class of grammars for their language. Thus 
Putnam's "common origin" hypothesis cannot supply an 
account of language transmission and hence is inadequate. 
Many innatists claim to derive support for the 
I.H. , Putnam asserts, from the fact that children 
learn languages with startling rapidity and ease. But 
surely, he objects, we can account for this phenomenon 
without appealing to the I.H. More particularly, he 
argues, it is not surprising that children learn a 
language as rapidly as they do, because they are 
constantly exposed to it. In comparison, language 
teachers claim that students can achieve mastery 
of a foreign language in 600 hours of direct-method 
instruction and achieve an incomparably greater 
vocabulary than that of a young child; by the age of 
four a child has been exposed to vastly more than 600 
hours of direct-method instruction, and so has had 
plenty of time to acquire even a difficult language.7 
But this objection, although illuminating the 
fact that certain students do acquire mastery of a 
language in a very brief time, overlooks several 
important aspects of linguistic behavior. First of 
all, it is not so clear that learning a second language 
is analogous in all relevant respects to learning a 
first language. One might plausibly argue that the 
acquisition of a second language takes the first as 
a model of some sort. Since the acquisition of a 
first language cannot bear this relation to a former 
language, except on pain of generating an infinite 
regress, it may be that the acquisition of a second 
language is considerably easier because of its special 
relation to the former. However such a suggestion 
might be evaluated, it is clear that the "second 
language" argument overlooks, like the previous 
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objections, a very important aspect of linguistic 
behavior. It was argued above that no amount of data 
can explicitly determine the acquisition of even the 
second language. More particularly, none of the 
grammatical rules found in grammars and none of the 
rules articulated by teachers of the language are 
strictly correct. Yet students who master the language 
do learn the exceptions to the rules. Hence the 
"second-language" objection just ignores that crucial 
feature of language learning which allows the acquisi-
tion of a grammar on the basis of degenerate evidence, 
and thus is inadequate to dismiss the I.H. 
Putnam's final objection to the I.H. is directed 
against the claim that the capacity for mobilization 
and acquisition of language is language-specific. If 
we commit ourselves to the existence of a language-
specific capacity, we must analogously commit ourselves 
to a mathematics-specific capacity, a puzzle-solving 
capacity specific to certain puzzles, and so on, 
because these capacities, too, are not determined 
completely by the data we receive. But this would be 
to multiply the "innate" capacities beyond the point 
of interest or illumination. Rather, the objection 
goes, it seems much more plausible to attribute the 
acquisition of language to general, multipurpose 
learning strategies which are employed in language , 
mathematics, puzzle-solving, and so o n . 8 
On close inspection, however, this objection 
appears to involve several difficulties. First of 
all, it baldly ignores the fact that nearly all 
children grasp the same grammar, whereas their 
puzzle-solving and mathematical competencies differ 
conspicuously. Thus the evidence for the I.H. is of 
an importantly different sort than that which one 
might raise in support of mathematics- and puzzle-
solving-specific capacities. Secondly, the objection 
renders extremely surprising the fact that there are 
linguistic universals of any sort; and in particular, 
it renders too surprising the fact that all children 
in a given language community acquire the same grammar, 
in spite of diverse and degenerate linguistic data. 
The above criticisms shield, if correct, the 
I.H. from Putnam's objections. Nevertheless, I think 
that even if one assumes that none of these criticisms 
are cogent, Putnam's view still is less coherent, to 
say the very least, than the I.H. The I.H., that is, 
offers a unified, though perhaps daring explanation 
of the existence of linguistic universals, the amazing 
rapidity and thoroughness with which children achieve 
linguistic competence, the "creative" aspect of 
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linguistic behavior, and accounts for the way in which 
a finite being can possess the power to recognize or 
potentially produce an infinite number of expressions. 
In contrast, these features have no comparable unity 
on Putnam's account. For first of all, the very reason 
there are linguistic universals of the sort we observe , 
the I.H. maintains, is just the reason why children are 
able to learn a grammar on the basis of degenerate 
evidence. On Putnam's account, in contrast, linguistic 
universals arose merely because language originated from 
a single community sharing a common language which 
contained certain linguistic features bound to be 
useful in any human social situation; on his view this 
fact has no connection with the fact that children 
learn the language based on degenerate evidence. 
Secondly, on the I.H., the conditions which permit 
the existence of linguistic universals insure the 
rapid acquisition of linguistic competence by children. 
Putnam, in contrast, insists that while the existence 
of linguistic universals is determined by social 
utility or the need for a recursive grammar, the 
rapidity of language acquisition simply comes from 
great exposure, and nothing more; on this view, then, 
the ease of language acquisition might be just as great 
even if there were no linguistic universals. Thirdly, 
on the I.H. the finite recursive nature of the grammati-
cal rules which the language user acquires is a 
consequence of the nature of innate linguistic 
universals; on Putnam's view there is not even an 
accidental tie between the two. 
If the choice were mine, then, I would, if Putnam's 
arguments are the strongest which can be brought against 
the I.H., cast my lot with the innatist thesis. Putnam's 
objections show at best, if the above criticism is 
just, that there will always be non-innatist interpreta-
tions of any given linguistic datum. This does not 
surprise me too greatly: in general, evidence rarely 
uniquely determines theory. But I believe that no 
science proceeds by inventing a distinct theory for 
each distinct datum which seems to fall within its 
province, as Putnam, by example, suggests we do; rather 
we seek unified accounts of what we imagine, barring 
strong objections, to be merely diverse pieces of the 
same mosaic. 
Indiana University, Bloomington 
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